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Abstract
The only extant fragment of Aristotle’s lost treatise On Prayer [Περὶ εὐχῆς] is an 
excerpt from Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s On Heavens [De caelo] (ad 
II.12, 292b10; ed. CAG VII; p. 485.19-22 Heiberg). Simplicius’ text, however, has 
been poorly edited for a long time, with several textual problems being spread 
unconsciously by the majority of the editors of the Aristotelian fragments, and only 
recently the text began to be properly clarified. The fragment 49 Rose3 was repeatedly 
exploited to sustain and to endow with antiquity and authority theological readings 
with Neoplatonist features, and there is a place where the establishment of the 
critical text is of the utmost importance for a research in quest for the possibility 
of understanding God and its intelligibility. This paper discusses the context of 
Simplicius’ testimony, the idiosyncrasies of the textual problems, the structure of 
the fragment, its lexicon (e.g. ὑπέρ and ἐπέκεινα), and the hermeneutical challenges 
it poses regarding its authenticity and interpretation within the Aristotelian corpus.
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1. The context of Simplicius’ testimony
It is within a voluminous commentary by Simplicius that one can find that remarkable text that is, until today, the sole extant frag-ment of Aristotle’s lost treatise On Prayer (Περὶ εὐχῆς, De preca-
tione, De oratione). This fragment occurs in a specific context whose 
discussion is worthy to recall, when the Neoplatonist commentator 
discusses the second book of Aristotle’s On Heavens (Περὶ οὐρανοῦ, 
De caelo):
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχει καὶ μετέχει τοῦ ἀρίστου, τὸ δ’ ἀφικνεῖται [ἐγγὺς]* δι’ 
ὀλίγων, τὸ δὲ διὰ πολλῶν, τὸ δ’ οὐδ’ ἐγχειρεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἱκανὸν εἰς τὸ ἐγγὺς 
τοῦ ἐσχάτου ἐλθεῖν·
So one thing has and shares in the best, another reaches it through a 
few steps, another through many, another does not even try for it, but 
it is sufficient for it to come close to the ultimate.1
In this passage, after investigating the unequivocal unity of the 
heavens – eternal, spherical, and non-generated nor coming to be – 
Aristotle focuses on the stars and heavenly bodies, namely their con-
stitutive orders, arrangements and movements, and the nature of these 
very movements once they are not self-moving. A problem concern-
ing these bodies arises when Aristotle considers the first aporia (II.18): 
being per definitionem immobile, how should not stars be considered 
simple inert or inanimate bodies, since there are empirical observa-
tions that point in a different direction, such as the problems of earth 
and moon translations. In order to address a problem of considerable 
technical complexity, Aristotle resorts to a principle of a general nature 
that will allow to consider the stars as participants – the crucial word in 
this argument – of activity. In the following remarks we will focus on 
this principle rather than debating the cosmological aporiai.
1. Arist. De cael. II.12, 292b10-14 Moraux. *ἐγγὺς codd., Bekker, Moraux : εὐθὺς Stocks, 
Allan. (‘ἐγγὺς’ is the consensual lectio of all manuscripts; however, the conjectural 
correction ‘εὐθὺς’ proposed by Stocks is a valuable reading with a strong philosophical 
sustainability.) Unless otherwise stated, I will be following Mueller’s translation (2005).
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The peripatetic philosopher writes that one being – unsurpris-
ingly the best, i.e. the unmoved mover or, in the Neoplatonist under-
standing, the One – detains and participates of – in itself, completely, 
and without any kind of activity – the chief good, the best. This is 
followed by the succeeding different orders that are hierarchically ar-
ranged, each one in its own place and according to its own capacity. A 
natural and understandable explanation of the disposition of the stars 
in the sky is not restricted to this, and the description is made in terms 
that allude naturally to the disposition of other physical realities, such 
as the animal and plant world. What Aristotle had just established is a 
broader principle of order, with a very general domain, that will be of 
major importance to a particular reading of the idea of physical and 
metaphysical ordering of sensible and intelligible realities.
The passage where one finds the fragment can be divided into 
three parts. The first of them is a paraphrase in which Simplicius re-
calls the Aristotelian principle:
λέγει οὖν, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων οὔτε τὸ πρῶτον δεῖται πράξεως οὔτε τὸ 
ἔσχατον, τὸ μὲν ἔσχατον, ὅτι μηδὲ τυγχάνει προσεχῶς τοῦ τέλους, τὸ 
δὲ πρῶτον, ὅτι οὐ διώρισται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίαν 
ἔχει αὐτὸ καὶ μετέχει αὐτοῦ.
And so he says that among existing things neither the first nor the last 
has need of action, the last because it does not directly attain the end, 
the first because it is not divided from the good but has it and shares in 
it in its own substance.2
Simplicius retains the vocabulary of his source but also intro-
duces different meanings and words, even if that is not very import-
ant at this point.3 Throughout his extensive commentary, one finds 
a genuine attempt of Simplicius to understand what he thinks to be 
the true doctrinal corpus of Aristotle, while he seeks to convey it into 
the conceptual apparatuses available to him. It should be noted that, 
apart from some synonymy between the two quotations above, the 
commentary of Simplicius underlines the inseparability between “the 
2. Simp. In Arist. De cael. [ad II.12, 292b10] 485.11-16 Heiberg.
3. Cf. Pépin 1968: 49-50.
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first” and “the good”, by virtue of the identification of their substances 
and their full mutual participation. The commentator goes further, 
and believes to identify an inaccuracy or at least a less precise phras-
ing in Aristotle:
καὶ εἴη ἂν τὸ μὲν ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπερουσίου λέγων ἀγαθότητος καὶ τοῦ 
ἑνός, τὸ δὲ μετέχειν ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ τοῦ προσεχῶς ἡνωμένου τῷ ἀγαθῷ 
καὶ μετέχοντος αὐτοῦ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τι προβεβλημένον 
οὐσίαν ἔχειν λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ἀπ’ ἄλλου λαμβάνον μετέχειν·
The word ‘has’ might be said of the hypersubstantial goodness and 
the One, and the word ‘shares’ of the intellect which is directly unified 
with the good and shares in it; for the One is said to ‘have’ in its own 
substance because it projects something, intellect is said to share 
because it receives from something else.4
The distinction is quite interesting. Simplicius suggests that “to 
have” is properly said of the relationship between the hypersubstan-
tial5 goodness and the One (since Plotinus, a name interchangeable 
with Good), this is to say, between one being and its own substance: in 
this case, between something (τι) that is beyond (ὑπέρ) being (οὐσία) 
and the beyond-being (ὑπερούσιος) of which that same something 
is; in other words, between transcendence itself and the transcended 
one. “To share” or “to participate” highlights a relationship with a dif-
ferent character, no longer under the sign of sameness, but between 
two different things, between one being and another being, between a 
postulate and a receptacle.
The Good (or hypersubstantial Goodness) is the supreme per-
fection among beings (and everything that is beyond them) and, as 
such, it is a maximally diffuser of itself – at this particular point we 
see how we are already a little distant from Aristotelian conceptual 
framework. In this sense, there is a close connection between the one 
4. Simp. In Arist. De cael. [ad II.12, 292b10] 485.16-19 Heiberg. Please note that, in 
Greek, “to have (ἔχειν)” and “to share” or “to participate (μετέχειν)” are two verbs 
with the same root and, as such, they are playing here a very interesting – and hardly 
translatable – game.
5. This expression – Mueller’s and mine – translates here the word ὑπερούσιος, due to the 
impossibility of a less literal version with simultaneous faithfulness to the original text.
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who has the good in itself and the one who tends towards it, who ap-
proaches it (as in the previous quotations) and who, the closer he is 
to the end to which he tends, the more he participates in it. The same 
is the case of the One, the highest holder of the Good, and of the in-
tellect (or, in a hypostasis, of the Intellect) that participates in it; the 
intellect participates in something, and that something is that which 
per se does not participate (on the contrary, it solely has). It is, then, 
something that can be found, which is (considering, of course, this 
particular use of the verb “to be” as inappropriate) “beyond”.6
2. Aristotle’s On Prayer
2.1. The text of fr. 49 Rose3 and its idiosyncrasies
This is followed by the third part of Simplicius’ commentary, the 
long-awaited return to Aristotle. First of all, my editing proposal of 
the fragment:
Aristotelis fragmentum XLIX De precatione sive De oratione
Περὶ εὐχῆς α’
(Rose2 46; Rose3 49; Walzer 1; Ross 1; Gigon 67,1)
apud Simplicii In Aristotelis De caelo commentaria [ad II.12, 292b10] 
(Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VII; p. 485.19-22 Heiberg)
19 ὅτι γὰρ 20 ἐννοεῖ τι καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, 
δῆλός ἐστι 21 πρὸς τοῖς πέρασι τοῦ Περὶ εὐχῆς βιβλίου σαφῶς εἰπὼν ὅτι 
ὁ θεὸς ἢ νοῦς 22 ἐστὶν ἢ <καὶ> ἐπέκεινά τι τοῦ νοῦ.
6. Further we will see the challenges of this “beyond”; for now, see the Plotinian intertext 
in quest: Plot. I.7.1; V.5.10; VI.1.4; VI.1.8; VI.6.6; cf. Pépin 1968: 50 passim.
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22 καὶ post Heiberg, Gigon, Pépin, Laurenti et mss. varia; om. DFc, 
Heitz, Karsten, Rose, Ross7; itaque post testimonia varia versionis de 
Moerbeka (1540, 1544, 1548 et 1555): «Quod enim intelligat aliquid et 
supra intellectum et super substantiam Aristoteles manifestans est in 
calce libri De oratore plane dicens quod Deus aut intellectus est aut et 
aliquid ultra intellectum».
And now my proposal of an English translation:
That indeed Aristotle conceives of something also beyond intellect and 
being is clear, at the end of the book On Prayer, where he clearly says 
that “God is either intellect or something even beyond intellect”.8
Some clarification should be given about the text quoted above, 
since it had a rather eventful fate and suffered several textual losses. 
The earliest manuscripts available date from the 13th century and are 
thought to be part of two codicological families, whose two oldest 
extant specimens descend from the same lost archetype. 
If this is a perfectly regular situation regarding the manuscripts, 
something completely abnormal happened in the editio princeps of 
the “Greek” text (1526). Heiberg  – the author of the most “recent” 
edition (1894 and still in use) – discovered that the editio princeps is 
actually a Greek retroversion from the Latin translation of William 
of Moerbeke, which was, at the time of its respective princeps (1540), 
“corrected” in the light of that false original Greek text. The ques-
7. Pépin (1968: 49, n. 2) admits that Ross omission of “καὶ” is an oversight, since he 
claims to quote Heiberg.
8. Alternative translations: “That Aristotle has a conception of something above intellect 
and substance is clear at the end of the book on prayer where he says clearly that 
god is intellect or even something which transcends intellect.” (Mueller 2005); “That 
Aristotle conceives of something above thought and being is obvious from his saying 
clearly, towards the end of his book On Prayer, that god is either thought or something 
even beyond thought.” (Mayhew 2007); “That Aristotle has the notion of something 
above reason and being is shown by his saying clearly, at the end of his book On 
Prayer, that God is either reason or something even beyond reason.” (Ross 1952). Since 
this paper was funded by a Portuguese university and there is only one translation 
available in (European) Portuguese (Caeiro 2014), I will suggest also a new Portuguese 
translation: “Que, de facto, Aristóteles considera algo também para lá do intelecto e do 
ser, é evidente pelo fim do livro Da Prece, onde diz claramente que «Deus é ou intelecto 
ou até algo para lá do intelecto».”
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tion – according to I. Mueller9 – turns out to be even more extrav-
agant, since Moerbeke translated from a manuscript older than 
those that still survive today and, moreover, considering that Robert 
Grosseteste also translated the second book of Simplicius’ commen-
tary (a translation whose material conditions still remain unknown), 
where the fragment of Aristotle was found. Evidently, in this case 
there are two – and not just one – critical editions to be prepared, 
starting with the editions of the extant Latin translations, so they can 
later help us clarify the Greek text, where there are plentiful lectiones 
but scarce certainties.
Although there are arguments standing for both sides about 
the authenticity of this Aristotelian fragment, the two catalogues of 
Diogenes Laertius (n. 14) and the Anonymous (n. 9) stand for its le-
gitimacy.10 It is also noteworthy the existence of a vita of Aristotle in 
Latin, dated from 1200, where there is a reference to this fragment, 
extending its interest far beyond the Neoplatonist influence.11
2.2. The structure and lexicon of the fragment
Considering its structure, the fragment can be divided into four 
parts:
(1) an initial explanative-descriptive proposition: “[…] Aristotle conceives 
of something also beyond intellect and being”;
(2) the main proposition: “is clear, at the end of the book On Prayer”;
(3) a locative assertion, which announces the quote: “where he clearly 
says”;
9. Vd. Mueller 2005: 2-4 and 135-6; cf. Pépin 1968: 53, n. 6.
10. Edited, respectively, by Rose3 and Düring; on the presence of this fragment on ancient 
catalogues, see Zanatta (2008: 345), Laurenti (1987: 706-7), Flashar (2006: 166) and 
especially Pépin (1968: 53, n. 1).
11. “fecit autem Aristotelis librum de oratione unde Simplicius ‘quod enim intelligat 
aliquid et supra intellectum et super substantiam Aristoteles manifestus est apud 
finem libri de oratione plane dicens quod deus aut intellectus est aut et aliquid ultra 
intellectum’” Düring 1957 apud Laurenti 1987: 706-7; cf. Zanatta 2008: 345.
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(4) a final declarative assertion (the quote from Aristotle): “that ‘God is 
either intellect or something even beyond intellect’”.
The fragment circulated during the Middle Ages without any 
doubts and, if there are no major reasons to suspect of its author-
ity, the framework assigned to it may raise reservations regarding 
its authenticity. Parts (2) and (3) do not need much discussion: the 
first of them clearly mentions the title of the book and the location 
of the subsequent quote (πρὸς τοῖς πέρασι); the other part typically 
introduces a quote ipsis verbis (σαφῶς εἰπὼν), which justifies the in-
sertion of the corresponding punctuation (quotation marks) in the 
translation. Part (1) has an introductory and explanative character of 
the enigmatic quote located in (4): God is either intellect or “even”12 
something beyond intellect, which – according to Simplicius (accord-
ing to Aristotle) – informs us that “even” Aristotle mentions some-
thing that is “beyond” intellect and being and, as such, validates the 
admittance of the disjointed hypotheses.
The dictionary entries of ἐπέκεινα and ὑπέρ  – both translated 
above as “beyond” – cover an overlapping semantic field, which ex-
plains the difficulties when trying to differentiate the two words.13 It 
is clear that ἐπέκεινα immediately alludes to the famous description 
of the Good in the Republic of Plato;14 on the other hand, ὑπέρ is a 
much complex case, since it contains in itself a myriad of meanings, 
of which three must be mentioned.
There is a locative meaning in ὑπέρ, which denotes to go beyond, 
to surpass a point, that could be translated as “supra something” or 
“above something”, but here this is not the case, unless one admits a 
metaphorical use of a locative framework in order to point out the 
speculated metaphysical realities. It follows the meaning that seeks to 
express a particular condition of excellency but, in this case, it does 
12. The best codices read this “καὶ”, which is supported by the tradition of Latin translations 
(see above the critical apparatus); cf. Mayhew 2007: 297, n. 10.
13. I have discussed this topic in Castro 2016.
14. “Καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ 
παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ’ ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας 
ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.” 
Pl. Resp. 509b6-10 Burnet; see also Pl. Phaed. 112b and Resp. 587b.
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not apply either, since in the Aristotelian system there can be no such 
thing that would be superior to rationality itself (whose apex evident-
ly is the intellect). The meaning that both words have in this fragment 
of Aristotle is intensive and/or excessive, i.e. “beyond” the simple di-
mension of intellect and being, marking a difference in identity with 
these concepts, a break that implies a discontinuous perceptual and 
epistemological dimension, no longer within the framework of hu-
man understanding, but instead proper to a “God” (and we will see 
how this is important in prayer). Thus, the chosen translation for “be-
yond” is justifiable, since excess must always be “beyond” something, 
and only secondarily (and figuratively) could be described as “above” 
or “higher than”.
Something that is or is to be found “beyond” (ἐπέκεινα or ὑπέρ) 
establishes such a difference that it could be even characterized as an 
ontological and perceptual cut: to the subject thus described (“God”) 
it is no longer proper the distinction between intelligent and intelligi-
ble and, concerning the pair transcendent/immanent, only transcen-
dence in its more radical sense could be admitted. The (dictionary) 
sense of ὑπέρ is so hyperbolical (forgive the repetition) that it could 
even mean a dissolution of dualism. This is why, in (typically Middle-) 
Neoplatonist philosophy, the formula ascribed to Aristotle – and with 
very noticeable evocations of Plato and an ancestral inheritance15 – 
was mobilized to refer to the ultimate ascension towards God (here 
identified with the Good “beyond Intellect” and later, in another 
Neoplatonist synthesis, identified with the Christian God), after the 
ascension to the Intellect and to the Beautiful. A formula that would 
become the leitmotiv of a philosophical system.16
Much has been said about the disjunction “either … or” (ἢ ... ἢ) 
15. “Die Geschichte der ἐπέκεινα-Formel ist vielschichtig; die Basis dieser Formel ist 
Platon, Staat VI, 509 a-b; sie ist immer wieder von Platonikern verwendet worden; 
möglicherweise schon vor Aristoteles Περὶ εὐχῆς.” Dörrie apud Whittaker 1969: 91, 
n. 1; cf. Flashar 2006: 167.
16. “Καὶ γὰρ ὅτι <ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας>, ἐπέκεινα καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ 
νοήσεως.” Plot. I.7.1.19-20 Henry-Schwyzer3; “Τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα τούτου τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ 
λέγομεν φύσιν προβεβλημένον τὸ καλὸν πρὸ αὐτῆς ἔχουσαν.” Plot. I.6.9.37-9 Henry-
Schwyzer3; vd. e.g. Celsus apud Origenes, Contra Celsum VII 38.1 and 45.24-5; this is 
a topic with plenty of literature: cf. Whittaker 1969 and Kalligas 2014: 217 and 221.
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and a number of strange misconceptions keep arising. In the schol-
arly literature, the question is to determine what the sense of the dis-
joints is: whether it is inclusive or exclusive. It is quite startling to 
see supporters of the inclusive reading, not only because that would 
not introduce any break, but also because of the surprise that causes 
to find Aristotle employing the Greek grammar with such creativity. 
In fact, this thesis was not sustained by J. Pépin – as some wrongly 
state – but by J. Bernays, with this latter author being quoted by the 
French in order to dismiss his thesis. What Pépin advocates is a read-
ing in favour of a complementary precision by Aristotle, paraphrasing 
the “or … even” as “more exactly” – a radical semantic change of a 
linguistic dispositive, which is quite counterintuitive –, arguing that 
the adding of καὶ (like in the best manuscripts) after the second ἢ 
attenuates the disjunction. However, I think Pépin was too optimis-
tic when he thought that this reading would be enough to avoid the 
mutual exclusion of the hypotheses, so radical and necessary as critics 
recognise it.17
2.3. Hermeneutical challenges
It is my belief that this is the main challenge of the treatise On 
Prayer. If we believe that Simplicius is quoting Aristotle word for 
word, iisdem verbis, then we must accept the rejection of the simul-
taneous possibility of something that coincides with the intellect and 
simultaneously is beyond intellect. That is to say, the last assertion of 
the fragment states that this God is either intellect or “even” some-
thing “beyond” this same intellect, in a disjunction of definitions such 
that  – vehemently denying any violations of the tertium non datur 
17. “Dans la perspective de ces historiens [scil. Bernays et al.] en effet, à la première 
partie du texte d’Aristote (ὁ θεὸς ἢ νοῦς ἐστὶν), la seconde (ἢ καὶ ἐπέκεινά τι τοῦ νοῦ) 
apporterait une précision complémentaire, que l’on peut par exemple introduire par « 
plus exactement » : « Dieu est intellect, plus exactement un intellect qui transcende celui 
de l’homme »; nulle rupture d’un membre à l’autre de la phrase, mais un développement, 
une progression, une continuité. Que l’on nous explique alors comment Aristote, pour 
rendre cette continuité, a justement choisi une tournure disjonctive (ἢ ... ἢ) dont le 
propre est d’exprimer la discontinuité !” Pépin 1968: 60; cf. ibid. 70; sed contra Laurenti 
1987: 709-10, 715-6, 722 and Zanatta 2008: 350.
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principle – the admissibility of one of these definitions rejects ea ip-
sa – and because of that – the other hypothesis. If God is intellect, 
then there is no considerable difference with the intellect itself; if God 
is beyond intellect, if in its own way and modus sui, surpasses and 
transcends the ontological and perceptual domains of the intellect, it 
is a Levinasian otherwise than being, an unspeakable domain, which 
is powerlessly pointed out with resource to the word “beyond”, when 
the categories of thought are then exhausted and surpassed.
The understandable suspicion of inauthenticity that I men-
tioned results from this philosophical panorama apparently atypical 
in Aristotle. Of the alleged Neoplatonism of this fragment one can 
say “se non è vero, è ben trovato.”18 If Aristotle was perhaps a little far 
from the contexts subsequent to his treatise, what would have been 
the subject of his treatise? Prayer, as an anthropological phenomenon 
transversal and virtually present in all cultures, certainly must have 
caused some interest on him. Since the most ancient lyrical compo-
sitions, poets and rhapsods have sung the alterity between gods and 
men – and a particularly noticeable thing is the difference between 
what a god allegedly knows or can do and what men are unaware of 
or what is beyond their control. In this context, prayer and divination 
would seek to partially bridge this mismatch between two distinct 
natures: to plead to be unveiled hidden mysteries or to be granted 
benefits – but the fragment, however, offers no elements pointing in 
this direction.
At a certain point of On Interpretation (Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, De inter-
pretatione), Aristotle writes the following concerning prayer:
ἀποφαντικὸς δὲ οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει· 
οὐκ ἐν ἅπασι δὲ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἡ εὐχὴ λόγος μέν, ἀλλ’ οὔτ’ ἀληθὴς οὔτε 
ψευδής.
18. One author wrote a small paper where he flatly rejects the authenticity of the 
fragment, based on the simplistic and imaginative idea that the title περὶ εὐχῆς would 
be a corruption of some περὶ εὐτυχίας (survived by the Latin title De bona fortuna), 
which would be a compilation of Aristotelian texts that was misinterpreted. (“A Greek 
text, including (but necessarily restricted to) M.M. 2.8 and E.E. 8.2 is compiled and 
originally entitled περὶ εὐτυχίας. It comes to contain, at some point, an unaristotelian 
phrase (absent from the original text of the E.E., and based on a misinterpretation of 
that text) saying that God is “‘greater than Mind.’” Rist 1985: 113.)
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[…] not every sentence is a statement-making sentence, but only those 
in which there is truth or falsity. There is not truth or falsity in all 
sentences: a prayer is a sentence but is neither true nor false.19
Aristotle does not seem very interested in investigating prayer as 
something that can be judged according to its truth value, but rather 
as a form of expression, a way to convey certain things. If it is possible 
that Aristotle is not concerned with a speculation on the apophantic 
character of prayer, it is also true that the tradition read the fragment 
as having such subject matter, mainly due to its hint of a dissolution of 
rationality in the final moment of apophasis – i.e. once all the affirma-
tions, negations, and negations of negations are exhausted, a celebra-
tion of ineffability and failure of language. But these are, once again, 
extrinsic philosophical instances.
The fragment XLIX occurs after an enquiry into how stars can be 
conceived “as enjoying action and life”.20 Following the thread of the 
argumentation, there is a clear cosmological tone in the discourse and 
therefore, at the same time, the discourse is partly a theological one, 
inasmuch as it manifest the opposition between two natures: on the 
one hand, the divine nature and, on the other hand, that nature that is 
proper to certain beings who, like the stars, have an intelligible reality.
Noticeably different from the reading of Pépin, which sees the 
fragment as a cosmic prayer, M. Zanatta21 advocates an interpretation 
of the fragment as having a religious character or, to be more precise, 
with a ritualistic character. It has already been seen that prayer has no 
direct epistemological character, as far as it does not allow the acqui-
sition of knowledge of anything and does not produce nor formulate 
new science. In this sense, the Aristotelian prayer has no intent to 
plea or to be laudatory, and it is not a means to ask for something (to 
the unknown). It reveals, instead, a contrast between the cosmologi-
cal-theological and the religious-ritualistic domains.
19. Arist. De int. 17a2-4 Minio-Paluello. Ackrill’s translation. In this passage, the Aristoteles 
latinus records translations by Boethius and Moerbeke, and also a commentary by the 
first author, crucial for the joint reception with the On Prayer.
20. “δεῖ δ’ ὡς μετεχόντων ὑπολαμβάνειν πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς·” Arist. De cael. 292a20-1 
Moraux.
21. Zanatta 2008: 351 passim; cf. Pépin 1968.
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Not being in itself a rite, prayer appears in a ritualistic context, at 
least if we attend to the Greek culture, like the culture one may find 
in early depictions in the Homeric poems and broadly in the Greek 
religious phenomena, in which human existence is lived and gains 
meaning through participation in rituals and celebrations. Deities are 
expected to intervene in human affairs – not infrequently in Greek 
mythology, the outcomes of these interventions were not exactly 
good – and to answer the prayers addressed. This would be the case 
of an access within the sphere of πάθος, which would be a particular 
case of transcendence of the intellectual dimension.22 But, as we have 
seen here, this is not the case.
We know that Aristotle wrote about a deity, but within a cosmo-
logical and metaphysical context, about a thinking reality with con-
templative activity – considering its more excellent sense – which he 
famously defined through the formula νόησις νοήσεως. If the God of 
the fragment is this intelligence (here coextensive with the Plotinian 
Intellect), then – and accordingly with the Aristotelian fragment – it 
is senseless to admit a category such as the relation, insofar its auton-
omy, self-sufficiency and transcendence exclude any and all alterity; 
if God is “thought of thought”, self-contemplative thought, then all 
kinds of relation with any being other than himself are structurally 
excluded.23 If it is authentic, what the available excerpt of the trea-
tise On Prayer aims at are not the phenomena usually associated with 
prayer itself, nor it is a “cosmic prayer”, as Pépin understood it.
Nevertheless, the same French author raises with subtlety the 
possibility that this very fragment may appear as a prayer at the end 
of the treatise on the homonymous subject. An unusual prayer, purer 
and different, a prayer befitted for a philosopher. This is a rather orig-
inal hypothesis that can provide a very ingenious explanation of the 
fragment in the line of the previous hermeneutical argumentation of 
this paper. Thus, we may suggest that, instead of a petition, this frag-
22. “[...] è un Dio che tocca essenzialmente la sfera del pathos e, come tale, è «sopra» la 
dimensione intellettiva, nel senso di «al di là» di essa.” Zanatta 2008: 351.
23. Likewise, it is as a thinking being that man is more similar to God (“thought of 
thought”), which corroborates the superiority of the contemplative life. See, e.g., Arist. 
EN X.8.
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ment could be a prayer that, appearing within a ritualistic context – 
following the same above-mentioned contexts  –, would only point 
out the difference of its own nature with that of the intellect; or rather, 
something that would signal the epistemological break that the di-
vinity is (considered solely within the religious context), through the 
terminologies and the ways of understanding the world proper to the 
philosophers. Not with rites but in his own context, the philosopher 
could also celebrate the divine, in his own way and with his proper 
means.
The fragment of the treatise On Prayer, even though if one be-
lieves in its authenticity, is too short and appears in a scarcely clarifying 
context. It is my belief that not much can be done besides scrutinizing 
its text and pushing the hermeneutic enterprise to the limits of the 
reasonable; that is to say, to investigate the meanings of its words and 
the framework that makes them meaningful. Substantial interpreta-
tions would require speculating “what Aristotle would have thought” 
about a given subject or attempting to reconstruct a historical-philo-
sophical framework with plenty of gaps. Even with this seemingly ad-
verse panorama and an aporetic ending, the interest of the fragment 
remains. Not only has it influenced a great number of late thinkers, 
but it also arouses curiosity today in those who are interested in a less 
widespread and yet undiscovered Aristotle.
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